



some conceptual and normative issues
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper; Lægaard, Sune
Published in:






Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., & Lægaard, S. (2020). Refugees and minorities: some conceptual and normative issues.
Ethics and Global Politics, 13(1), 79-92. https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735014
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@ruc.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 02. Dec. 2021
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=zegp20
Ethics & Global Politics
ISSN: 1654-4951 (Print) 1654-6369 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/zegp20
Refugees and minorities: some conceptual and
normative issues
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen & Sune Lægaard
To cite this article: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen & Sune Lægaard (2020) Refugees and
minorities: some conceptual and normative issues, Ethics & Global Politics, 13:1, 79-92, DOI:
10.1080/16544951.2020.1735014
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735014
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 29 Mar 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 566
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
Refugees andminorities: some conceptual and normative issues
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen a,b and Sune Lægaard c
aPolitics, University of Aarhus, Aarhus C, Denmark; bPhilosophy, UiT – the Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø,
Norway; cDepartment of Communication and Arts, Philosophy, University of Roskilde, Roskilde, Denmark
ABSTRACT
Inmany contexts, states have aduty to take specialmeasures to protect
minorities. Does this duty include prioritizing minority over majority
refugees? To answer this question, we first show that a vulnerability-
focused notion of ‘minorities’ is preferable to a numerical one. Given
the vulnerability-focused notion, there is a presumption in favour of
prioritizingminority overmajority refugees. However, this presumption
is sometimes defeated. We identify five conditions under which this is
the case. In fact, surprisingly, under special circumstances, states should
prioritize certain majority over certain minority refugees.
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The concept of minority status plays an important role in many areas of political philosophy,
e.g. multiculturalism, affirmative action, discrimination and hate speech. Take the first
example. On the standard understanding, multiculturalism is concerned with the presence
of cultural, etc., minorities within a society as well as the special rights, forms of recognition
and other political measures that minority status might justify (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Taylor
1994; Galeotti 2002).
Many think that states ought to give some special weight to the protection of minorities
within their own borders. Others think, and, indeed, offhand it appears plausible, inter alia, in
the light of howmoral theories implyminorities to be treated in an intra-state context, that the
states ought to give some special weight to the protection of minorities among refugees
(Vitikainen 2020).2 In both cases, it is generally assumed that the reason why special group-
focusedmeasures are justified is that the relevant beneficiaries form aminority. Butwhatmust
a minority be for minority status to be a reason for special protection? In this article, we pose
CONTACT Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen lippert@ps.au.dk Politics, University of Aarhus, Bartholins Alle 7, Aarhus
C 8000, Denmark
1A previous version of the paper was presented at the ‘Refugees and Minority Rights: Acceptable and unacceptable
criteria for accepting/rejecting refugees in a non-ideal world’ conference at UiT-The Arctic University of Norway,
14–15 June 2018 and at the section for political theory at University of Aarhus. We are grateful to the audiences on
those occasions, in particular: Andreas Albertsen, Andreas Bengtson, Göran Duus-Otterström, Sarah Fine, Søren Flinch
Midtgaard, Matthew Lindauer, Kieran Oberman, Serena Parekh, Viki Pedersen, and Jens Tyssedal.
2We use ‘special protection’ here in a loose sense. More specifically, we believe that many instances of minority rights,
which seem to amount to special protection in the form of exemptions from a general rule, simply amount to
redesigning the social space in such a way that it accommodates not only the needs of the majority members but
also the needs of the minorities, e.g. disabled people who are unable to move around in public space without
wheelchair access (cp. Barry 2001). We agree and simply use the term ‘special protection’ as a placeholder for a set of
rights about which we can remain non-committal for present purposes.
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this question at the level of non-ideal theory, specifically with regard to refugees, even though
some of what we say is applicable to minority protection in general.3,4
To provide a satisfactory answer to our question, we first need to clarify what
a minority is. Given that the distinction between minorities and majorities, literally
understood, has something to do with numbers, the intuitively most obvious starting
point is a numerical notion of minorities. However, this notion does not track what
friends of minority protection are concerned with, and accordingly, we propose an
alternative vulnerability-focused notion of minorities (From a numerical to a
vulnerability-focused notion of minorities). On that basis, we go on to explicate certain
important features of that notion (Dimensions of the vulnerability-focused notion of
minorities). Minority refugees: the duty to rescue and the principle of irrelevant goods‒
The site of vulnerability then offer five reasons why, despite a presumption in favour
thereof, somewhat surprisingly, states should not always give priority to minority
refugees over majority refugees. Noticeably, this is so even on our vulnerability-
focused notion of minorities, which tracks the moral concerns underpinning minority
protection and, thus, seems more congenial to prioritizing minority over majority
refugees than a numerical notion. Conclusion sums up our main claims.
From a numerical to a vulnerability-focused notion of minorities
We begin with the conceptual question of what a minority is. The simplistic numerical
minority notion offers the following answer:
A certain group of individuals constitutes a minority (/majority) if, and only if, together
they constitute less than (/more than) half of the relevant population.
Given a particular background understanding of which population is relevant, this notion
gives us intuitively proper classifications of a number of cases, e.g. it implies that LGBT+
people form a minority in Russia.5 The notion is natural to apply in cases where
a population is (believed to be) dichotomously divided into two exhaustive and mutually
exclusive groups – the majority and the minority. Finally, this simplistic notion is straight-
forward and makes it natural to speak about minorities in the way that it suggests. Take
Andrew Altman’s characterization of affirmative action as ‘positive steps taken to increase
the representation of women and minorities in areas of employment, education, and
culture from which they have been historically excluded’ (Altman 2018; cp. Lippert-
Rasmussen 2020, 10–12). Surely, the reason why he uses the formulation ‘women and
[our italics] minorities’ is that women are not a numerical minority.
3Some might object to our question on the grounds that, according to international law, states have a duty of non-
refoulement, which makes it illegal for them to return asylum seekers to states where they are vulnerable to
persecution, thus, making the question of prioritization largely irrelevant (Fine 2020). While this observation about
international law is correct, its significance for our question is limited. The duty of non-refoulement leaves open many
ways in which states could prioritize among refugees. Presently, most refugees are prevented from ever reaching the
countries in which they want to apply for asylum, and one important way of prioritizing among refugees is by making
it harder or easier for certain groups of refugees to be able to enter their preferred recipient country in which they
can then apply for asylum.
4Our discussion falls under non-ideal theory, partly because many refugees are refugees in virtue of others’ non-
compliance with the demands of morality and partly because of the pragmatic considerations, e.g. administrative
efficiency, which motivates our focus on vulnerable groups as opposed to vulnerable individuals (see below).
5This is the problem of defining the relevant population for a minority. We return to this problem later.
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However, the simplistic notion is over-inclusive.6 Consider Shia Muslims in
Lebanon. They make up 27% of Lebanon’s population – a tiny bit more than Sunni
Muslims and significantly more than any other Lebanese religious group. It would be
wrong to count Shia Muslims as a minority on the purely numerical grounds that they
make up less than half the Lebanese population, given that they form a group larger
than any other religious group.7 If we did, we would have to say, unhelpfully, that in
Lebanon, everyone belongs to a minority (religious) group. This suggests that we adopt
the modified numerical minority notion:
A certain group of individuals constitutes a minority (/majority) if, and only if, together
they constitute a group, which is smaller (/larger) than the (/second-) largest group in the
relevant population.
This notion accommodates the previous counterexample, but it too is over-inclusive.
Suppose that Sunni Muslims form 26% of the Lebanese citizens.8 It is implausible that on
this purely numerical ground it forms a minority, given that it is almost as large as the
largest group – Shias – and that all other groups are significantly smaller, e.g. Maronite
Catholics 20%, Greek Orthodox Christians 8%, and the Druze Community 5%.
At this point, we suggest that we change tracks. While more refined numerical
notions of a minority are possible, it is more fruitful to articulate the concern that
underpins our responses to the cases that we have described directly. After all, the best
explanation of why a certain group of people qualifies as a minority group is, we
contend, that they are likely to be vulnerable in a way that other groups are not. Call
this comparative vulnerability. In light thereof, we suggest the vulnerability-focused
notion of minorities (/majorities):
A certain group of individuals constitutes a minority (/majority) if, and only if, its
members are significantly more (/less) vulnerable compared with members of other
relevant groups in a way, which is morally significant.
Vulnerability, whether comparative or non-comparative, can be generic or relational;
the latter being a specific form of generic vulnerability. An agent suffers generic
vulnerability if he or she ‘suffers a substantial risk of a significant loss in the relevant
metric (welfare, resources, capabilities)’ (Vrousalis 2013, 133). Non-relational vulner-
ability contrasts with, for example vulnerability due to threats from other agents and is
sometimes relevant in cases of natural forces, e.g. drought.9 Relational vulnerability
necessarily involves reference to the power of other agents and is thus often political or
social. B is relationally vulnerable to A if ‘(i) B lacks some desideratum x that is
a requirement for, or a constitutive feature of, B’s flourishing (in which case x is the
object of B’s need), (ii) B can only obtain x from A, and (iii) A has it within his
discretion to withhold x from B’ (Vrousalis 2013, 134). The notions of generic and
relational vulnerability need to be filled out by a specification of which metric is morally
6We also believe that it (and the other numerical notion we introduce below) is under-inclusive, but we postpone this
issue until later in this section.
7This is not to deny that we might do so on other grounds.
8No official census has been made since 1932. Hence, reliable accurate figures are unavailable.
9While anthropogenic climate change refugees are vulnerable as a causal result of the power of agents and how they
have exercised it, i.e. by emitting greenhouse gases, their vulnerability, e.g. to flooding, can be described without any
reference to the power of agents.
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relevant and which needs are necessary for flourishing. Generally, our discussion
focuses on minorities afflicted with relational vulnerabilities.
If, plausibly, vulnerability is often linked to group features, such as ethnicity, religion
or gender, this gives us a pro tanto reason to address the predicament of such a group.
In the first instance, vulnerability is a property of individuals and accordingly provides
reasons for the protection of these individuals. Nevertheless, we focus on vulnerabilities
linked to groups. This is so for two reasons. First, most of the types of vulnerabilities
that matter are group related, e.g. threats to basic security are often due to membership
of ethnic, religious or other types of socially salient groups. Secondly, the question of
this article concerns justifiable decision procedures at the level of non-ideal theory
rather than ultimate criteria of rightness in ideal theory. Such real-world decision
procedures have to focus on more practical criteria, such as group membership, even
if individual vulnerability is what ultimately matters.
The vulnerability-focused notion of minorities has the welcome implication that the fact
that a certain group forms a minority is a pro tanto reason to do something to address their
predicament. So, the move to the vulnerability-focused notion of minorities not only
addresses the intuitive problems with the numerical notions described above, it also
provides a rationale for linking minority status to special protection. Still, one might ask
why we want our notion of minorities to focus on vulnerability rather than, say, oppression
or domination. We take domination, e.g. on the republican understanding as one agent’s
arbitrary or discretionary power over another agent (Pettit 1997), to be one form of
relational vulnerability. Oppression is a more clearly moralized notion and is sometimes
used more or less interchangeably with domination but also often as a structural phenom-
enon where the reference to particular agents is not required. Vulnerability includes many
forms of domination but is a broader notion that can also include threats due to non-
human factors. Accordingly, we conjecture that the concerns, which guide our classificatory
intuitions with regard to the minority-majority distinction, are captured by the vulner-
ability-focused notion of minorities. Obviously, however, vulnerability in this sense and
numerical size can be pried apart. This forms the basis for two potential challenges to our
vulnerability-focused notion of minorities.
First, if minority status is not conceptually tied to the numerical size of a group, why
use the term ‘minority’ as opposed to, say, ‘vulnerable groups’? This challenge can be
answered. It is possible to explain why ‘minority’, e.g. in the context of refugee
protection, is an apt term, even if purely numerical facts do not form the supervenience
base of minority status. Sociologically speaking, generally larger numbers translate into
less vulnerability of the members of a group, e.g. Sunnis in Saudi Arabia relative to
Shias, and, accordingly, group size is highly negatively correlated with vulnerability,
even if sometimes they come apart, e.g. as when white South Africans were a small,
non-vulnerable numerical minority under Apartheid. In short, the normative concern
underpinning minority rights is not conceptually tied to being a numerical minority,
even if it so happens that the relevant concern is rarely triggered in the case of
numerical majorities but often triggered in the case of numerical minorities, thus,
making the term ‘minority’ an apt one in most contexts involving the protection of
vulnerable groups.
Secondly, if minority status is conceptually tied to vulnerability and if, as seems
conceptually possible, a numerical majority may be vulnerable relative to a numerical
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minority, we should, in such a case, say that the latter forms a minority in the relevant
sense and is in need of minority protection. While this may seem strange in purely
linguistic terms, there are historical cases where this has occurred, e.g. in relation to
colonialism. In such cases, special rights protecting a numerical majority could natu-
rally be seen as cases of minority rights. Suppose that the majority of people in
a country consisting of indigenous people recently colonized by a numerical minority
of European settlers find themselves in a precarious situation where their language and
culture are in danger of perishing. In this situation, labelling special laws protecting
indigenous culture and language ‘minority rights’ would seem linguistically appropriate,
even when they form a numerical majority in the relevant state.10
However, there is a unified and more basic reply to both challenges just addressed, to
wit that, from a moral point of view, the interesting issue is not whether to chart the
proper use of the term ‘minority’, which is probably not completely fixed in ordinary
language. The interesting issue is to see if there is a notion of minorities, which is such
that it reliably tracks a relevant normative concern (cp. Laborde 2017 on interpretative
concepts). We believe a vulnerability-focused notion – to be explored further in
Dimensions of the vulnerability-focused notion of minorities – does so to a higher
degree than a numerical notion of minorities. Specifically, we note that, other things
being equal, it seems morally more important to address vulnerabilities of numerical
majorities than those of numerical minorities for the simple reason that, again other
things being equal, it is morally better to help more rather than fewer people. Hence, if
there is a special case for minority protection, that case must derive directly not from
the numerical characteristics of minorities but from the special difficulties they face, e.g.
their vulnerability. This also means that we make the conclusion we eventually want to
establish – that sometimes it is morally permissible to give majority refugees prefer-
ential treatment – harder to justify on a vulnerability-focused notion of minorities than
on a numerical notion and, thus, more interesting.
Dimensions of the vulnerability-focused notion of minorities
In this section, we unfold a vulnerability-focused notion of what a minority is along six
different dimensions. First, while many are inclined to think of minority status as
a matter of either‒or, the vulnerability-focused notion suggests otherwise; the reason
being that vulnerability allows for degrees. We could understand ‘significantly more
vulnerable’ as involving a precisely defined level of comparative vulnerability such that
any level of comparative vulnerability, which falls below that level, is insufficient for
qualifying as a minority status, whereas any level at or above the threshold qualifies as
a minority status. However, any such threshold is arbitrary, and in any case, the
normative concern that motivates minority rights tailors the location of the underlying
scalar degree of vulnerability. That being said, the latter either–or distinction might still
play a useful heuristic role, so we shall set aside the issue of continua of vulnerability.11
10Recall also our case of Apartheid where it would seem odd to call rights protecting the completely dominant,
numerical minority ‘minority rights’.
11A similar issue arises for numerical notions of minorities.
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Secondly, consider next the notion of being ‘morally significant in a particular way’ (see
our vulnerability definition in the previous section). Presumably, we needmoral principles to
tell us when a certain vulnerability is morally significant. In this sense, our vulnerability-
focused notion of minorities is a ‘normatively dependent concept’ (Forst 2013, 32‒35). One
cannot identify minorities in the relevant sense independently of normative considerations
and determine, which vulnerabilities matter. Since there are many competing accounts of
what the right moral principles are, there are many different competing accounts of which
groups form minorities. A right libertarian, for instance, might acknowledge very few
minorities compared to egalitarians (cp. Kukathas 2007; Kymlicka 1989). If, to mention
a third possible normative principle, our fundamental concern is with equal civic status and
that citizens can be assured that their equal status will be respected, the relevant minority
might be those who are especially vulnerable to having their equal status put in question (cp.
Waldron 2013 on hate speech). Our general concept of minority status does not tell us which
of these conceptions is best, and we invite the reader to simply assess our arguments on the
basis of those vulnerabilities that he or she finds morally relevant.
Thirdly, on the vulnerability account, which groups form aminority is context sensitive in
that it depends on the empirical facts of the relevant case, and different normative principles
will pick out different empirical facts as being relevant. Jews in Tunisia, for instance, might
form a (tiny) minority, even if Jews in Israel do not. More generally, when certain groups are
thought of as minority groups, it is because we assume a particular context in which these
groups are subjected to certain comparative vulnerabilities (cf. the definition of vulnerability
above and Sally Haslanger (2000, 41) on gender and race).
Fourthly, consider next the qualification ‘in a particular way’. Many groups are vulnerable
in many different ways. Coal miners are vulnerable to their industry becoming obsolete in
response to climate change. Fashion designers are vulnerable to changes in fashion, which
render their particular creative skills irrelevant. Yet, we would not say that coalminers and
fashion designers are minorities in the relevant sense, even though, obviously, they are both
vulnerable in certain ways. These ways are relevantly different from the ways in which racial,
religious, political or sexual minorities are vulnerable. While fashion designers, unlike coal
miners, might be more vulnerable than other groups to changes in fashion, they are not
vulnerable to being worse off overall than most other groups. After all, fashion designers are
fairly well off and secure onmost socio-economic dimensions, e.g. income and status, and not
just on any vulnerability, but the vulnerability to being worse off than other groups on
a suitable measure of overall advantage is crucial to minority status. Moreover, the means,
which one could use to address the vulnerability of fashion designers and coalminers – e.g.
funding of retraining programmes and unemployment benefits – are very different from the
sort of means that one typically employs to address the vulnerabilities of minorities, e.g.
promoting small languages by making them official languages in which the citizens can
communicate with the state. There seems to be little reason to address the vulnerability of
fashion designers and coalminers through group rights, group recognition or other group-
specific measures that take up much of the debate in the literature on multiculturalism.12
Similarly, there are some vulnerabilities, e.g. vulnerability to extreme weather events, which
12A common liberal objection to such measures is that for them to be justified, the groups must in and of themselves
be of moral significance. However, group-specific measures can simply be instruments for achieving a political aim
that consists only of respecting and promoting the interests of individuals (Lægaard 2017).
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make less sense to mitigate by granting asylum than others do, e.g. vulnerability to religious
persecution.
We now turn to the fifth feature of our vulnerability-focused notion of minorities, to
wit, that whether a group is vulnerable depends on which other groups are the relevant
groups to compare with. Since being a minority, based on our definition, is a matter of
being especially vulnerable to certain forms of treatment compared with other groups,
we need to specify which other groups to compare with. This essential comparativeness
has important implications.13 Given that our minority concept not only serves
a normative function but is also in itself normatively dependent, this will go for the
specification of the relevant comparisons as well. Hence, to determine which groups to
compare and in which respects for the purpose of deciding whether some of these
groups should have minority status, we need to invoke the normative principle that
gives normative force to minority status in the first place. This is an important point to
be aware of since it makes minority status dependent on the scope of normative
principles. In the context of refugees for instance, minority status of a certain group
of refugees will depend, inter alia, on whether one compares their degree of vulner-
ability with other groups of refugees from their state of origin or with refugees in
general.
A sixth important feature concerns the site of vulnerability. One suggestion is that we
compare the vulnerability of different groups prior to their seeking refuge. Another
suggestion is that we compare the vulnerability of different groups qua refugees. These
two vulnerabilities might come apart. Members of a religious minority might be subjected
to severe persecution in their country and, thus, be much more vulnerable than other
groups in their country. Yet, it might be that refugees from this minority find it very easy to
be granted asylum in several recipient countries in which their religion forms the majority
religion and, thus, are eager to admit co-religionists to flee persecution. Qua refugees, they
might be less vulnerable than refugees from the dominant majority in their country.
In this section, we have drawn attention to six features of the vulnerability-focused
notion of minorities, to wit, that: 1) its supervenience base is scalar, 2) it is normatively
dependent, 3) it is contextual, 4) only certain kinds of vulnerability bear on minority
status, 5) it is inherently relational and 6) different sites of vulnerability might matter.
Minority refugees: the duty to rescue and the principle of irrelevant goods
We will now apply the vulnerability-focused notion of minorities to a discussion of the
ethics of admission of refugees. We ask if it is always morally justified to give priority to
minority refugees over non-minority refugees given our vulnerability-focused notion of
minorities. We will assume that states do not admit all refugees that ought to be
admitted because, say, in the light of costs, the states do not have a duty to admit all
refugees who ought to be admitted, or even though they do, they will not and, thus,
priorities have to be made (see footnote 2). We argue that, despite our vulnerability-
focused notion of minorities, in some cases it is justified, perhaps even required, not to
give minority refugees preference over majority refugees.
13Numerical notions of minorities are comparative too, only they merely involve numerical relations, e.g. ‘being
significantly smaller than’.
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In the course of defending this claim, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that
admitting refugees is a matter of preventing harm to others.14 This is not always the case. If,
say, a state unjustly wages war against another state and in the course of doing so causes
citizens of the latter to starve and flee the country, then it fails to prevent its action from
actively harming these citizens by way of their precarious nutritional predicament if it
declines to admit them as refugees and thereby providing them access to food. Moreover,
on the assumption that agents, including states, have special duties to prevent their actions
from unjustly harming others, such a state might have a reason to give priority to non-
minority refugees from that state over minority refugees from other states fleeing oppression,
etc. This is also the reasonwhywe set aside such cases. It seems too obvious that in such cases,
states may have a reason not to give priority to minority refugees for the predicament of
which it bears no responsibility over non-minority refugees whose predicament it wrongfully
caused.
The second assumption we make is that in cases where an agent is under a duty to help
others whose predicament the agent bears no responsibility for, there is a prima facie reason
to help as much as possible. Suppose that you are on the ocean in a boat with plenty of space.
Suppose also that you discover some people to the left who are drowning and an equal
number of people to the right who wears life vests and is able to swim to an island close by but
whowill later suffer from significant, lifelong health problems due to their ordeal in the water.
Assuming that you have a duty to rescue but cannot rescue more than one group, you have
a duty to rescue the group of people who will lose the most if you do not help them. On the
assumption that a state’s duty to admit refugees can be thought of as a duty to rescue, the state
should similarly admit refugees such that by doing so, it helps the most. Given our vulner-
ability-focused notion of minorities, this would seem a good reason to admit minority
refugees rather than majority refugees.
We believe that in many cases, this assumption is warranted. Suppose that a totalitarian
state is such that all groups of citizens are subjected to human rights violations. However, the
totalitarian state is particularly systematic and brutal in its human rights violations of
members of a particular religious minority. In this case, recipient states ought to give priority
to the minority refugees from that state over the non-minority refugees, given that it will not
admit all refugees from that state, which it ought to admit. Consider now a different case.
A totalitarian state severely violates the human rights of the citizens it suspects of opposing it.
It does so largely, but not completely, irrespective of group membership. Members of
a certain linguistic minority experience slightly worse repression than members of the
majority linguistic community do, e.g. they are slightly more likely to suffer arbitrary
detention. Though all citizens of the totalitarian state suffer severe repression, members of
the relevant linguistic minority suffer slightly worse repression, and, thus, giving priority to
the linguistic minority refugees would help more when we hold the number of refugees
admitted fixed, so, along the lines described above, there would seem to be a prima facie
reason to favour the former minority group. However, this case might be an exception from
the presumption in favour of minority refugees. All the refugees in question flee their country
to avoid having their basic human rights violated, and fairness arguably requires that all get an
equal chance of enjoying this basic good. Members of the linguistic minority will benefit
slightly more from being admitted than non-minority refugees, given that they face slightly
14But see Parekh (2020).
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worse repression, but that extra benefit is what, in a bioethical context, Kamm (2013, 424‒
426) has labelled ‘an irrelevant good’.15
If we embrace this view, it is difficult to see why a similar view should not apply in
our refugee case. In short, in cases where minority and non-minority refugees flee
severe repression, and the former group experiences only slightly worse repression, we
should, all other things being equal, give equal priority to minority and non-minority
refugees. One implication of this is that when we must prioritize between male and
female refugees who flee from the sort of severe human rights violations typical of
prolonged civil wars, e.g. prolonged torture and arbitrary detention for extended
periods of time at unknown detention facilities, one should not give priority to female
refugees from such countries, if in addition to being vulnerable to such gender-neutral
human rights violations, they are also subjected to comparatively mild forms of sexist
discrimination on the labour market, e.g. implicit gender biases, which means that
sometimes a slightly worse qualified male applicant is selected instead of a slightly
better qualified female applicant.16
Creating and downsizing minorities
In this section, we explore how refugee policies might affect which minorities exist and
their size such that states should not always prioritize minority over non-minority
refugees out of a concern for minority protection. First, giving priority to minority
refugees might affect the situation of minority members other than the refugees.17 One
way it could do so is by downsizing the minority in the country from which minority
members flee, thus – let us suppose – making the remaining members even more
vulnerable. In this case, not giving priority to minority refugees might be better for
non-fleeing minority members, in which case a concern for minorities might be
a reason not to give priority to these refugees among all refugees. In fact, it could be
a reason to give priority to majority refugees since doing so might over time turn what
is presently a minority into one that is not.
Some might accept this point but suggest that while in principle it is correct, its
relevance for real-life cases is dubious. We concede that while there might be some
truth in this reply, it does not take sufficiently into account the cumulative effects of
migration over time. The situation of Jewish and Christian minorities in the Middle
15Suppose that a doctor can save only one of the two patients from a life-threatening infection. As a side effect, the
treatment will also cure one patient of a minor skin complaint, but not the other patient. In light of the relative
insignificance of being relieved of the minor skin complaint compared to having one’s life saved, Kamm thinks that
the extra benefit the doctor could bring about by treating the former patient should not determine whom he or she
treats. He or she should flip a coin, giving each of them an equal chance. The good of being cured for a minor skin
complaint is an irrelevant good when it comes to choosing which of the two patients to save from death.
16Kamm’s ‘Sufficient Good Only Option Argument’ motivates a stronger claim (Kamm 2013, 436‒441). Suppose that
minority as well as non-minority refugees flee mortal danger. Suppose moreover that majority refugees will be
oppressed in various ways if admitted by the state to which they have fled, whereas minority refugees will not.
(Suppose that we cannot eliminate this wrongful oppression, but we can affect who are admitted.) In this case, giving
priority to minority refugees would bring about more good. However, arguably we should not give priority to
minority refugees, given that everyone’s life is at stake and that, so Kamm contends, the majority refugees might
have as great an interest in surviving as the minority refugees (despite the fact that they will enjoy worse lives if
admitted).
17The present line of argument is parallel to related arguments in the ‘brain drain literature’, implying that we should
assess the permissibility of allowing, say, doctors from poor states to migrate to rich states, partly in the light of how
that will affect other groups within poor states (cp. Oberman 2013).
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East, where, since the Second World War, many of these minorities have been deci-
mated due to migration in large part, illustrates this.18 In any case, migration might not
only affect minorities in the countries of origin but also in recipient countries, and here
we think that relevance to real-life cases is more apparent.
Accepting refugees might affect which groups formminorities in the recipient countries.
Take Lebanon again. It is a special case in the sense that refugees or descendants of refugees
do not get Lebanese citizenship. But suppose they did. Given the massive influx of refugees
from Syria – approximately 1.5 million in a country with 4.5 million citizens – giving
priority to minority refugees from Syria would significantly affect the relative sizes of
different religious groups in Lebanon. Given that, by far, the most Syrian refugees are
Sunni Muslims, we could imagine, for instance, a situation where giving priority to
minority refugees from Syria – Sunnis form the numerical majority in Syria, but given
that the regime is Alawite, arguably they form a minority on our vulnerability-focused
notion of minorities – would over time turn Lebanese Shias into a minority group (or, if
you think they already are, making them even more of a minority group). If so, it might be
permissible for Lebanon not to give priority to minority refugees in the interest of avoiding
creating a new minority in the recipient country, which, if history is any guide to go by,
would then become more vulnerable to various forms of oppression, neglect, etc.19
In short, giving priority to minority refugees will not only affect refugees applying for
asylum. It will also – and especially as an accumulated effect of demographically
significant migration – affect which minorities exist and how large they are, and in
turn, these two factors will affect the level of oppression of minorities. Hence, in a way,
which might initially seem paradoxical, a concern for minorities might not always
motivate giving priority to minority refugees.
Some might object that to decide asylum policies on the basis of the sort of
demographic considerations is to use refugees as mere means to benefit others (some
of whom might not even be existing individuals but are people who will come into
existence depending on our choices regarding refugee policies). For example, we reject
applications for asylum, even though the asylum seeker’s individual situation warrants
giving priority to that asylum seeker as part of the policy of aiming at benefiting other
members of the minority group to which the asylum seeker belongs.
While there might be some force to this objection, it is weakened by the following two
observations. First, our duty not to treat persons as mere means might not be absolute.
Perhaps if enough good is at stake, we might justifiably treat some refugees as mere means
to protect other members of the minority to which they belong. Secondly, arguably the case
we have described does not involve treating minority refugees as mere means. After all, the
very rationale for the rule of prioritization is precisely an ex ante concern for the interests of
18Generally, in consistency with our previous discussion of this matter (cf. From a numerical to a vulnerability-focused
notion of minorities), we stress that we are not claiming that reducing the size of a minority, numerically speaking, in
all cases increases its vulnerability. However, members of a religious minority are more likely to be vulnerable the
smaller it is relative other religious groups, e.g. because of fewer people to push for its particular political concerns
being accommodated or interests being promoted.
19Some might object that Lebanese politicians among others should not take for granted that, say, minorities will be
oppressed, etc., like they have been in the past. Rather, they should act to prevent such oppression, etc., in the future.
We agree. However, pursuing this objection is simply pursuing a different line of argument than the non-ideal one
that we pursue.
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all members of the relevant minority, and, possibly, this shows that the relevant priority
setting does not involve treating any members as mere means.
Culpable minority refugees
An additional reason for not giving priority to minority refugees appears in situations
where minority refugees are complicit in the oppression of the majority in their country
of origin. If so, it seems morally perverse to give them priority over majority refugees.
Consider Sunni refugees from Iraq who actively supported Islamic State, though with-
out actually committing any war crimes, etc. Suppose, moreover, that a state will admit
either some such refugees or an equal number of Iraqi Shia refugees.20 Suppose,
realistically, that, unlike in the recent past, Sunnis now form a vulnerable minority in
Iraq. In this case, if we give some moral weight to responsibility, we should possibly not
give priority to these Sunni refugees (as opposed to non-complicit Sunni refugees).
Arguably, we should not do so, even if they did not play any counterfactual, causal role
in the plight of the relevant Shia refugees, who will be granted asylum in their stead.
No doubt that people will have different views on the degree of complicity, which
will warrant a lowering of the priority in the refugee queue that one is entitled to, but
our claim is simply that at least for some such, a possibly high degree lowering this
priority is morally required.21 This is how we think about the duty to rescue in general.
Return to our example of the two groups of people who are swimming in the water. If
the members of the group who will drown if not rescued are complicit in the situation
of the group that can reach land through their own efforts – say, they unjustifiably sunk
their ship – then the idea of which of the two groups we should rescue changes, i.e. we
should now rescue the non-culpable individuals despite the fact that they do not face
the threat of drowning but only a lesser, but still sufficiently, serious threat of, e.g.
having a limb amputated due to hypothermia.
Vulnerable minorities or vulnerable refugees
In the discussion so far, we have discussed examples of refugees who are vulnerable because
they belong to a minority group in their country of origin. However, it might be suggested
that the correct focus is on how vulnerable refugees will cope if denied asylum compared
with if they are granted asylum. If refugees, who are denied asylum, are sent back to their
country of origin, whether they belong to a minority there, generally bears on that question.
However, discrepancies could arise as to when having fled a country, this could be taken as
a sign of disloyalty to the regime in the country of origin such that returned refugees will
now be highly vulnerable whether they are minority or majority people. In such cases,
giving priority to minority refugees might be wrong.
Some might object that the present view introduces a kind of objectionable moral
incentive to flee. Suppose that initially one has a weaker case for being given asylum
than minority citizen from one’s country of origin. At least in cases where only
20We can suppose that the reason they flee is related to the political and social effects of Islamic State.
21Specifically, we are not claiming that there are acts such that complicit people should not be rescued, even when,
unlike in the case we discuss, rescuing them involves no costs for others.
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a limited number of refugees can be granted asylum, it seems as if majority citizens
might have a duty not to flee so as to give the minority citizens a greater chance of
getting asylum and, thus, that it would be absurd if, as a result of violating that duty, the
majority citizens then acquire a stronger claim to asylum.
We have some sympathy for this challenge. However, we think that it does not apply to all
cases. If even majority citizens suffer severe repression, etc., it might be unreasonably
demanding to require them not to flee to escape repression so as not to take up places that
would otherwise have been allocated tominority refugees. In such cases, we do not consider it
morally absurd to think that by choosing to flee, and hence acquiring additional vulnerabil-
ities, one might thereby affect the priority among asylum seekers that one is entitled to.
The site of vulnerability
Consider finally the site of vulnerability. In most discussions of refugees, it is assumed that
the relevant site of vulnerability is the nation state from which the refugees are fleeing.
However, an obvious alternative is to adopt a global perspective instead. Which groups
form minorities might depend on which site of vulnerability we assume. The Yezidis form
a religious minority in Iraq, numbering roughly half a million people whose plight at the
hands of Islamic State received worldwide attention recently. Suppose, unrealistically, that
events following the defeat of Islamic State had resulted in two small areas of Iraq being
carved out to form two small, independent states for the Yezidis whose citizens in both
states were almost exclusively Yezidis. Hence, in these two states, the Yezidis constitute
a majority. However, if we shift our focus to a global level, we might think that the Yezidis
form a minority. Globally speaking, the group is extremely small compared to its comple-
ments, e.g. Christians and Muslims, and the existence of the two Yezidi states would in all
likelihood be very fragile. Suppose that one of these two states degenerates into a despotic
regime, resulting inmany Yezidis fleeing. A concern for minorities when pitched at a global
level could justify the democratic Yezidi state giving priority to refugees who do not belong
to a minority in the country from which they flee, i.e. Yezidi refugees from the despotic
Yezidic state, over refugees who belong to non-Yezidi minorities from the state fromwhich
they flee, e.g. Sunni refugees from Iraq.22 One way to put it would be in Kymlickean terms,
i.e. that in order to preserve their cultural structure, retaining a Yezidian character of the
two small nations is important. In the light of recent events, it might also be argued that the
Yezidis living elsewhere are safer – they have an exit option – when there are stable Yezidi
states to which they can flee if persecuted in the countries in which they live.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that numerical notions of minorities are unhelpful from the
perspective of a concern for minority protection. In their stead, we have proposed and
analysed a vulnerability-focused notion of minorities, which offhand seems much better
placed to capture the relevant concerns. However, even given this notion of minorities, which
renders giving priority to minority refugees much easier to justify, we have suggested that
22Obviously, this is only true when we are talking about refugees in numbers that over time will be demographically
significant.
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there are at least five reasons why minority refugees should not always have a higher priority
than majority refugees.23 First, in some cases, the additional vulnerability endured by
minority refugees is not significant relative to the vulnerability of non-minority refugees.
Secondly, the case of demographically significant refugee migrations giving priority to
minority refugees might worsen the situation of existing minorities or create new vulnerable
minorities over time. Thirdly, some minority refugees are complicit in making majority
refugees flee. Fourthly, strictly speaking, we should be concerned with the vulnerability of
people after having fled rather than minority refugees that qualify as such due to their greater
vulnerability of members of this group in their country of origin. Finally, if we adopt a global
perspective on vulnerability, it might be justified for small groups, globally speaking, within
their own state not to give priority to minority refugees when, over time, that will increase
their vulnerability. We should end by reminding the reader that we believe there is
a presumption in favour of giving priority to minority refugees simply on the grounds that
doing so will domore good, other things being equal – a presumption that will often be borne
out by the facts. Still, it might be important to know what might sometimes defeat that
presumption.
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